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Abstract
The paper documents  the case of Uganda's  The authors  find that Uganda did not sacrifice
telecommunications  reform.  Uganda  is one of only  two  significant sales proceeds  by choosing competition, but
countries  in Africa  that decided to privatize  instead gained  tremendously in both the speed and scale
telecommunications  in a competitive  framework by  of investment from its early  focus on competition.
selling a  second national  operator  license.
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The authors may be contacted at mshirley@worldbank.org,  fgebreab@worldbank.org,  or Ihaggarty  iworldbank.org.  June
2002.  (68  pages)
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I.  Introduction
Telecomnmunications  reform is an accepted reality throughout the world, and
especially in the developing world where it has become a pre-condition  for new
investment.  While the planned  outcome is the same in all cases,  limited global
experience means that there is no well tried reform path that can give assurance of
success in any given set of circumstances.  It is therefore important to document and
study the various methodologies that have been tried in different countries with the
purpose of identifying best practices as well as common success factors that can guide
those countries that are just starting on the reform process.  This is the major motivation
for this case study that addresses Uganda.
The case study is part of a larger research program analyzing the effects of
regulatory,  legal, political and bureaucratic institutions on telecommunications  reforms in
Africa. The outcomes of privatization in regulated sectors such as telecommunications
depends heavily on regulatory institutions (Noll 2000, for a survey of the empirical
literature on privatization  see Shirley and Walsh 2000).  While technological change has
increased the potential for competition in telecommunications  in the sector, and hence the
need for regulation, the extent to which competition operates effectively will itself
depend on regulatory and political institutions.
An important goal of this research program is to measure the net returns from
competition under the highly imperfect market and institutional circumstances  that
prevail in most African economies.
The research program addresses this goal through detailed analysis of six cases:
besides this study of Uganda, we also analyze Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, Malawi,
and Tanzania.  Uganda's bold approach to telecommunications  reform provides  a good4
opportunity to test the basic premises of our research project.  Uganda, like Ghana,
allowed competition in basic services by selling a second network license during late
1997/1998.  It also has competition in cellular and value-added  services.  Uganda sold the
majority shares of its incumbent operator,  Uganda Telecommunications  Ltd (UTL),  in
June 2000 after three unsuccessful attempts.
The first hypothesis of our work is that competition  in telecommunications  will
improve performance more than monopoly provision. Among the improvements that we
expect are lower prices, better service, wider access, and faster expansion of capacity.
Competition has costs, including the loss of any scale economies  and the inability to use
cross subsidies to bring service to selected groups or locations  (apart from the implicit
subsidy in obligations to roll out services to areas  that are not viable in the short run). We
expect that these costs will be offset by the more efficient operation of firms  subject to
market discipline,  and that scale economies will continue to be eroded by technological
progress.  Some analyses suggest that competition will also result in lower proceeds to the
government  from the sale of the incumbent operator or from operating licenses, and
lower investment.  The argument is that governments in developing countries have low
credibility and must offer protection against competition to attract capital  for the purchase
of the firm and investment in sunk assets.
The second hypothesis is that buyers will pay more for a monopoly but will invest
less than under competition, and the benefits from investment will outweigh the costs
from lower sales revenues (including the distortionary costs from higher taxes).  This
follows not only from the well known argument that monopolies have less incentive to
invest than firms facing competition, but also because monopolies, especially those5
owned by foreigners, face a higher political risk from pressures to control monopoly
rents.  Of course there may be intermediate solutions, whereby governent extends a
temporary exclusive  license and the research will attempt to establish the effects of
exclusivity agreements with different duration.  This analysis must necessarily include a
judgment about whether the regulator will do a better job of (a) enforcing competition or
(b) forcing a monopoly provider to offer as good a service at as low a price as would
prevail under competition.  Frail political systems and weak regulatory capacity could
allow opposing interests to capture the institutions and organizations needed to support a
competitive market,  reducing the benefits from competition.  Whether competition will
be preferable to monopoly under such circumstances is an empirical question,  since the
same institutional weaknesses could also prevent the regulator from controlling a
monopoly provider,  and the threat of entry with even nominal competition may have a
salutary effect on the dominant provider.  Countries with unstable governments or weak
protection for private property rights may also be unable to establish competition because
they do not have enough credibility to attract private investors to a competitive market.
Third, we hypothesize that how well competition is sustained or monopoly
controlled -- in other words, how much performance is improved -- will depend on
regulatory characteristics  and their goodness of fit with a country's institutions.  Based
on Noll 2000, our hypotheses  are that performance will be better when:
*  regulatory discretion is limited;
*  regulatory personnel are not subject to short term political pressures;
*  the regulator can require detailed information from the operators;
*  the regulatory process is open to public scrutiny and6
*  regulatory decisions are  subject to appeal to a credible body that has less of a
stake  in the outcomes than the participants,  such as an independent court.
Our project also explores the political economy of competition in African
telecommunications.  We expect that competition is more likely to be introduced if the
levels of penetration  and service  achieved by the incumbent  are below average for
countries of similar size and development,  and if those opposing competition (workers
who might lose their jobs, bureaucrats who might lose power, buyers  who might lose the
potential  rents) are not well organized, not able to credibly threaten to withhold support
from key government actors, or not important  to the government's  support base.  The
introduction of competition will also be more likely the more credible the government
with potential  investors, since that will enable it to attract multiple bidders.
This case study begins  with an analysis of Uganda's telecommunications  sector
prior to reform in Section II and describes how these circumstances  made privatization
with competition more likely.  It then documents  in Section III the political circumstances
leading to reform,  and considers whether competition will be sustained.  Section IV
discusses the objectives  and implementation of the reform, while Section V discusses the
regulatory  framework.  In Section VI, the nature of the reform and the outcomes so far
are assessed,  and Section VII concludes with an assessment of the implications of our
findings for policy and for our larger research project.
II  Circumstances in the Sector Leading to Reform
As explained  in Section I, we expect that countries are more likely to choose
competition  in telecommunications  sectors where  service has been poor, access  is below7
average for the region, and profitability, low.2  The reasons for this are threefold.  First, a
history of poor service and failed reforms will dispose governments  to try more radical
changes,  such as privatization with competition.  Moreover,  public opinion will be less
likely to favor the staff of an incumbent with a poor record.  Second, the lower the access,
the smaller the incumbent,  and hence the greater the likelihood that a rival can challenge
its dominant position. Competition will be more feasible, making it possible to attract
bidders for a second network license even where regulation might be weak.  Third,
government has less reason to give exclusive licenses to buyers of a small system with
poor profitability:  sales revenues are likely to be small, even with exclusivity, while
expansion is likely to be more rapid in a competitive market.3 As we show below, all
three conditions in the telecommunications  sector  in Uganda favored  reform.  The
incumbent was small, service was poor,  and profitability,  low.
(i) Service Before Reform. Uganda is a small country which had approximately  18
million inhabitants  in 1994 (now greater than 20 million), and a largely rural population
(88 percent of the population).  It is also poor; the per capita GDP was US$190  at the
time of reform in 1994. Telecommunication  services in Uganda were much worse than
the regional  average before implementation  of reforms started in 1994. Service was
provided by a state owned monopoly, Uganda Posts and Telecommunications
Corporation (UPTC).  At the time of the reform UPTC had  115 exchanges with capacity
to handle about 62,000  lines, but had only 30,449 lines in service (Laidlaw and Parkinson
1995 and UTL data).  As a result, for the period 1985 to 1994, there were only 1.6 main
2  This is  explored in more detail in the conceptual  framework paper for the research:  Noll and Shirley,
1999.
3  Of course, low profitability  may discourage  entry unless the new entrants believe that they can make a
reasonable return.  This was the case in Uganda, for reasons we discuss later.8
lines for every 1,000 inhabitants in Uganda.  This penetration rate was low even in
comparison to that of countries with similar levels of per capita income  (see Figure  1).
Figure 1: Teledensities  of Selected  African Countries (1994)
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Source: ITU
There was virtually no expansion in access during the early 1990's.  Instead,  a
dramatic reduction occurred  in 1993  when UPTC cut service to all subscribers  who failed
to answer a letter asking if they were interested in having a telephone.  The goal was to
drop "ghost subscribers"  from the network, but many subscribers complained that they
never received the letter.  All existing (and prospective)  subscribers had to reapply (or
apply) for service.
Estimates of demand for the mid- 1  990's are now recognized as having been very
low, but suggest that while the potential telecommunications  market was not large, UPTC
did not cover half or even one third of the estimated market.  ITU numbers suggest a
waiting list in 1994 equivalent to only about 8 percent of installed lines, but estimates of9
demand in 1993 were much higher: 71,000 to 80,000 lines forecast to grow to 155,000 to
194,000 by 2005  (Laidlow).4 These demand numbers were underestimates.  Four years
later an in-depth ITU study estimated  demand for fixed line service at 184,000 lines in
1997 -- more than three times the lines in service that year (51,829)  -- and projected that
demand would grow by 8.5 percent a year, reaching 380,000 by 2006 (IFC, 1997).  Even
this later projection is now recognized  as having been low.  New operators in Uganda
report that demand has greatly exceeded their initial forecasts and they have experienced
problems providing enough capacity.
One problem in estimating demand in Uganda is the concentration of the system
in the capital, which meant that many potential subscribers  outside of Kampala would not
see any reason to put their names on a waiting list.  As Figure 2 shows subscriber  lines
were heavily concentrated  in the capital in 1997,  and the story is similar for public
phones and installed capacity.  Even though Kampala had less than 10 percent of the
population,  it had 70 percent of all subscriber lines in 1997, while the Eastern and
Western regions of the country, home to more than 50 percent of the population, had only
20 percent.  Many rural residents had to travel to the capital in person to conduct business
because phones were not available where they lived.  Kampala had 62 percent of installed
capacity in 1993, although only about a third of this was used (nation-wide only 34
percent of capacity was used).  Finally, potential demand estimates at that time did not
recognize or reflect the preference and potential for mobile as opposed to fixed services
for businesses whose activities are themselves mobile or decentralized.
4Based on current GDP per capita,  Laidlaw and Parkinson 1995  estimated  1994 demand at  100,000 (page
21).10
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Source:  Report  on Liberalization and Privatization  of the Telecommunications  Sector, The Committee  on Investment  in
Telecommunications,  Uganda, Kampala,  November  1993
Only about a third of capacity was being utilized in 1994, but much of this "book"
capacity was not actually available  for use. A number of switching systems were not
operating, especially the electro-mechanical  switches outside of Kampala (where the
digital exchanges were concentrated).  Not only was equipment outmoded, poorly
maintained  and inoperative  due to a lack of spare parts; some of the technology installed
with donor funding was incompatible.  A 1989 rehabilitation project supported by the
World Bank and various aid agencies  improved the external  cable networks  for Kampala,
Jinja and Entebbe and allowed the purchase of necessary materials  and equipment for
better maintenance,  doubling the size of the usable network.  The rest of the country,
however, was largely beyond the reach of this project.
Although the rehabilitation project expanded the system's reach, quality of
service remained far below the project's original targets.  Only 25 percent of local calls
(the target in the rehabilitation project was 60 percent) and 40 percent of international
calls were completed on average  in 1993.  Only about 30 percent of faults were cleared11
within 24 hours (the target in the rehabilitation project was 60 percent), 53 percent within
a week and 62 percent within a month.  Poor customer service in general,  and incorrect
billing due to fraudulent diversion of lines in particular, were causes of much bitterness
against UPTC.
On the plus side UPTC does not seem to have been as overstaffed as some State
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the region.  Labor productivity in UPTC in  1994 was on a
par with the regional  average of 25 mainlines per worker, and better than much of our
sample (Figure 3).5  Furthermore,  it had improved greatly since the lows of the late 1980's
(Figure 4).  However,  the Africa average  is poor compared to other regions; the average
for 1994 in Latin America, for example,  was 119 main lines per employee  (ITU).
Figure 3. Main Lines Per Employee,  1994
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5  Labor productivity may be overstated because of the problem, described  above, of non-operating
switching systems.12
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These numbers suggest that there was little reason for public opinion to support
the status quo in UPTC.  Most people did not have access to a phone and had little
prospect of connection  in the foreseeable future.  Those who did have lines had frequent
and lengthy problems with faults; those who could make phone calls were often unable to
complete their calls; and all subscribers  suffered from UPTC's poor customer
management.  Although labor productivity was the same as the sub-Saharan Africa
regional average,  that average is a poor one by world standards.
(ii) Finances. The financial situation in UPTC also favored a radical reform such
as privatization with competition.  In contrast to the situation in many other countries,
telecommunications  was not a major source of revenue for the government of  Uganda,
despite very high international  and national long distance tariffs in the early 1990's.  (In
1993, for example, calls to the U.K. or U.S. were US$7.50 a minute, national long
distance calls rose quickly from US$0.08  to US$0.59  per minute for distances over 700
kms, while local calls were only $0.05  a minute.)  Revenues per main line fluctuated13
between US$1,000 and US$1,400 before reform, which is similar to the sub-Saharan
regional average of US$1,260 in 1993  (Figure 5).
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During the pre-reform period in the first half of the 1990's UPTC's revenues were
largely determined by earnings from international calls, which averaged  70 percent of all
accounting revenues in 1993.  This was the result of a deliberate policy to raise
intemational rates from 1985 in order to reverse the intemational traffic flow.  Because
Uganda had more outgoing than incoming calls, UPTC had to pay other operators in
scarce foreign exchange and the govemment hoped to discourage outgoing traffic (field
interviews). Not only were international  tariffs high, they were pegged to the US dollar
from September 1991  to 1993.  Pegging reduced UPTC's foreign exchange losses, but
also further depressed demand, especially since the Ugandan Shilling was not convertible
to hard currencies.  When it became increasingly apparent that a high pegged tariff was
not sustainable, tariffs were reduced (Figure 6).14





8  UK,  US and most continental Europe




1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Source:  UPTCIUTL
Although the volume of outgoing international calls increased  after tariffs were
reduced, it was not enough to offset falling tariffs and revenues decreased  slightly.  As a
result, return on assets, which had gone up to a respectable  9 percent in 1993,  fell
sharply back to more historical  levels (Figure 7)  6
6 The UPTC/UTL accounts used for this report have been adjusted using the average rate for bad-debt
provision, reporting  losses from launch failures of Intelsat satellites the year they occurred;  reporting
administrative  expenses,  taxes and internal telephone  usage revenues  from prior years as prior year
adjustments in 1996 rather than extraordinary items in 1996.15
Figure 7. UPTC/UTL Return on Assets7
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Meanwhile,  expenditures  continued to grow in the 1990's, driven by rising labor
and administrative costs (Figure  8) and as a result the company's profits dwindled.
Expenditure and revenue controls were weak and the company had persistent  problems
with inaccurate billing and weak collection (World Bank  1996).  Provisions for bad debts
were high (30 percent in 1993,  for example), but not high enough;  only about half of all
accounting revenues were actually collected  (Laidlaw and Parkinson,  1995). Collection
problems were compounded by the government's delays in paying its bills combined with
UPTC's inability to keep accurate accounts of goverrnent indebtedness (World Bank
completion report,  1996).  Informal practices of "netting off' debts between  UPTC and
other government agencies left balances that were usually owed to UPTC  and seldom
paid (Laidlaw and Parkinson,  1995).
7  The asset revaluation and bad debt adjustments involved the following: (a) Fixed Assets in operations,
depreciation and inventories have been revalued using the CPI, and  (b) Accounts receivables  and provision
for bad debts have been adjusted assuming a maximum of 180 days for collections.  ARBDA refers to
Asset Revaluation  and Bad Debt Adjustment.16
Figure 8. UTL Real Operating Revenues  and Operating Expenses  Index
(Base year=  1990/91)
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Operating expenditures  were equal  to or exceeded operating revenues (including
foreign exchange gains) during the latter part of  the 1990's. However,  since a large part
of the operating revenues was not actually collected, UPTC's financial situation was
much worse than these numbers suggest.
UPTC's balance sheet during the pre-reform period was dominated by foreign-
currency  debts owed to international and donor agencies  and to other telecommunications
agencies.  Typically,  UPTC would fail to pay the government for servicing the loans and
in 1994 swapped some of its debt to the government  for government receivables on its
telephone bills.
In summary, UPTC was not a "cash cow" for the government;  to the contrary it
was a drain.  Privatization would reduce government's exposure to UPTC's debts, and
possibly improve tax revenues, although  it would also presumably require government to
begin to pay its telephone bills promptly. UPTC's weak finances were also a factor in17
favor of competition.  The government had less reason to want to maximize its sales
revenues by giving an exclusivity period to UPTC's buyer, since it was not faced with the
problem of replacing a revenue stream that would be lost when the company was
privatized.
(iii) Regulation. UPTC was largely self-regulated.  The Uganda National
Frequency Registration Board (NFRB) was created to give "stakeholders",  defined as
ministries and agencies with an interest in the sector (Army, Police, Internal Affairs) a
voice in policy, but most decisions were controlled directly by the company and its
Board.  The Minister of Works, Transport and Communication had the power to approve
tariffs under the 1983 UPTC Act, but no clear process or criteria were detailed.  In
practice the Ministry would approve most of UPTC's tariff requests, albeit with long
delays.  According to the Act the Ministry also had the power to license other operators,
but no provision was made for regulating interconnection.
UPTC's situation favored privatization with competition.  In most countries
telecommunications  workers are the main opponents  to privatization, and they are often
strongly supported by bureaucrats who stand to lose power and perks if the firm becomes
private. In Uganda there was no large government bureaucracy with a strong stake in the
sector.  The virtual absence of regulation also opened the way for a totally new regulatory
body, with fewer ties to the incumbent operator than an existing bureaucracy might have
had.18
III.  Political Factors Leading to Reform
Earlier we argued that circumstances in the telecommunications  sector favored
competition in Uganda.  In this section we examine the political factors that precipitated
the reform.  This section first analyzes the changes that made telecommunications  reform
of any kind politically desirable.  It then considers what led to competition.
(i)  Macroeconomic Crisis  and The Impetus for Reform.  Shirley and Menard
(2002) argue  that reform in infrastructure  is more likely when there are significant
problems  in the sector combined with a macro-economic  crisis, usually hyper-inflation.
We have already described the serious problems of the telecommunications  sector in
Uganda, but none of these problems was new and could not have precipitated the
decision.  What was new was the reform-minded government of President Museveni, and
its response to the macroeconomic  crisis and donor pressures.
Uganda has had a troubled history since its independence in 1962, suffering a
series of bloody dictatorships and long civil wars.  In 1986, the last civil war ended when
Kampala fell to the National Resistance Movement (NRM) led by Yoweri Museveni.
Initially the Museveni  administration followed the previous government's policies of
tight government control.  Growth rebounded after the end of the civil war, but began to
slow by 1988 (Figure 5). Support from international  agencies and other donors had almost
dried up, while inflation was high and rising (Figure  10)  and there was a large and
persistent budget deficit (Figure I1).19
Figure 9. Uganda:  Real GDP Growth Rate
(Average  Annual Percentage Growth)
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Figure 11. Uganda:  Public Sector Deficit  as a Percent of GDP
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Persistent macroeconomic  problems led the government to begin to liberalize the
economy,  and push for improvements in the operations of general government and the
SOEs.  While initially the government tried to improve SOEs, it became disillusioned
with this approach,  as we document in the next section.
(ii) Political  Costs and  Benefits of Privatization  and Competition.  Initially the
NRM government favored state ownership and tried repeatedly  to improve SOE
performance.  Indeed, various new enterprises were founded under ownership  of the army
under the umbrella of the National Enterprise Corporation.  This policy was a practical
one, aimed at improving efficiency  and curbing corruption,  rather than an effort to make
political capital with SOE workers.  To the contrary, the regime had no particular
political stake in the survival of the SOEs.  Museveni's initial support base was largely
outside of Kampala and the government apparatus, with especially strong support in the
resistance forces and southern farmers.  After taking power in  1986, Museveni moved to
develop a support base that incorporated many of the competing political, religious,
regional and ethnic factions in Uganda, bringing their leaders into a no-party21
government.  The central bureaucracy was not part of his core constituency,  as evidenced
by his policies to reduce the size of government employment and decentralize power.
The civil service was more than halved, and a number of measures were taken to
decentralize power to the regions through the Resistance  Councils (Mugaju  1999).  When
repeated efforts to reform SOEs failed, the regime abandoned the effort and turned to
privatization.
Initially, Museveni's  speeches suggested that he did not view telecommunications
as a priority; rather, telecommunications  was seen as a luxury, of limited importance to
the new regime's supporters (field interviews).  However, management paralysis,
accusations of corrupt behavior and a subsequent inquiry convinced the government of
the need to reform UPTC through privatization.
The circumstances that led to this decision began in November  1990 when
UPTC's newly appointed Board of Directors decided to run the company on a day to day
basis, resulting in frequent conflicts with some of the UPTC top managers (World Bank
1996).  This resulted in long delays in procurement and other decisions, major holdups in
the rehabilitation project,  and unsubstantiated dismissals of key personnel, as well as
accusations of irregularities in procurement.  In response to these problems the Minister
of Works, Transport and Communications  appointed a Commission of Inquiry in
September  1992.  The Commission's report led to the replacement of most of the Board
in November,  1993 and dismissal of members of management aligned with the Board in
March  1994.  The Commission's report cleared the board of corruption but exposed a22
number of management  weaknesses  at UPTC, and contributed to the government's
decision  to privatize the company (field interviews). 8
In addition to these problems, concerns  were rising in the Museveni
administration  that bottlenecks in communication might threaten Uganda's rapid
recovery of GDP.  According to the Uganda Investment Authority, a poor
telecommunication  infrastructure  was seen by potential  investors as one of the obstacles
to investing in Uganda.  The government had decided to hold elections in 1996, and
continued economic expansion would help cement its already strong position.  Since
multilateral  and bilateral aid agencies  were no longer willing to lend for investment  in
state-owned telecommunications  companies, government would need a private buyer to
supply new investment  capital (field interviews).
The main opposition to privatization came from the UPTC workers, but they
could not inflict serious political costs on the administration.  The workers were not key
to the regime's survival and had little public sympathy for reasons already discussed.
(The opposition of UPTC management  to privatization had no sway in the reform
decision because of the  1993 Inquiry and  1994 layoffs of managers mentioned earlier.)
UPTC's workers could not be entirely ignored, however,  because of the regime's policy
to be inclusive  and rule abiding, so some concessions were made to win the union's
support. The workers had pushed for voluntary retirements or termination of all
employees, which the government rejected because of the expense of meeting UPTC's
generous, unfunded pension obligations.9  Instead the government agreed to set up a
8 The government  is reputed to have contacted  IFC when the Commission's report was known and asked if
the Corporation could sell UPTC in a month (field interviews).
9  UPTC had started as part of the East African Posts and Telecommunications  Corporation which had
agreed to very generous pensions.23
pension fund that would be independent of the privatized firm, and agreed in principle to
issue shares in the privatized  company to the pension fund.  The amount of shares to be
issued is still under study:  a figure between 5 - 10% has been suggested by the ministers
responsible.  Further negotiations/discussions  will be held to firm this up.  Government
also agreed to worker participation in the management committees.  Approximately 400
UPTC workers were laid off (based on age and heath), with another 400 layoffs planned.
The political desirability of competition, as opposed to privatization,  is harder to
determine.  One reported reason for the decision to offer a second network license is that
the government was concerned about its ability to regulate a private monopoly (field
interviews).  Another factor seems to have been the lack of priority given to universal
access.  Unlike many state-owned  telecommunications  companies,  UPTC did not have a
universal service obligation.
The other political motivation  factor is related to the earlier observation that
UPTC was not a cash cow.  The sector was therefore not viewed  as a business
opportunity from which more money could be made through reform.  It was rather seen
as a catalyst for investment, creating a strong motivation  for independent regulation,
liberalization,  and open competition. The administration's  lingering view that
telecommunications  were a luxury for most Ugandans added to their preference  for
competition  and full cost recovery pricing over monopoly,  even though the later could
use cross subsidies to expand access to poor communities.  The government was also
poorly disposed toward exclusivity due to its experience with Celtel (the first mobile
operator).  In 1994 Celtel was granted two years exclusivity in mobile cellular operations,
which the government expected  would ensure large and rapid investment.  However one24
year later Celtel was still having difficulty raising funds  from investors, was creaming the
market, and had not expanded  rapidly, cooling  enthusiasm  for exclusivity in government
circles (field interviews).  The example of Ghana, which Ugandan officials had visited
and studied, also influenced the Uganda government's  decision to sell a second network
license (field interviews).  Finally,  as we have seen, Uganda had less reason to expect that
the proceeds from the sale of an inefficient and unprofitable UPTC would outweigh the
costs of an exclusivity contract.
(iii) Political  Feasibility. Political feasibility of telecommunications  privatization
and competition was never in doubt in Uganda.  Museveni had ended a long and bloody
civil war and enjoyed a long honeymoon.  Most Ugandans wanted the restoration of
normalcy and an end to conflict, and the President was seen as personally responsible for
the present stability (field interviews).  Furthermore,  his liberalization program had been
successful in reducing inflation, curbing the budget deficit and spurring growth, and was
politically popular.  Museveni's control over the pertinent decision making agencies was
further strengthened by his decision to bring opposition leaders into his cabinet, building
a consensus government.  Under the circumstances no viable opposition to
telecommunications  reform emerged in parliament or the bureaucracy.
(iv)  Credibility. Credibility that the new policy would be sustained was more
doubtful, but several factors helped.  First, the credibility hurdle has fallen in telecoms
with the advent of new technologies that reduce investments  in sunk assets compared to
traditional  wire line systems.  Second, the government's reputation enhanced the
credibility of its telecommunications  policy.  The layoffs in the civil service, privatization
in other sectors (72 enterprises were sold for a total of US$143 million), action against25
corruption (in the Privatization Unit, for example), and peaceful  and honest elections in
1996, all helped reassure investors that the government's reform promises were
believable.  Less credible were promises that the new regulatory framework would be
enforced  and a level playing field would be sustained in the future, through successor
administrations.  As we shall show later,  this lack of credibility slowed, but did not halt
the process.
IV.  The Objectives  and Implementation of the Reform
The rules that govern regulated industries are to some extent path dependent.  It is
important,  therefore, to understand what were the government's  objectives  for reform
telecommunications,  and the specific transactions that took place.
(i) Objectives of the Reform.  Initially competition was not a major goal of
Uganda's telecommunications  reform.  The reform program was motivated by the  1993
report of the Committee on Investment in Telecommunications  (CIT) described above,
and was primarily meant to reduce government financial support to UPTC and remove a
potential  obstacle to the rest of the economic program.  After reviewing the CIT report,
the government issued a white paper in 1994 in which it proposed to divide UPTC into
postal and telecommunications  services, incorporate the telecoms services as Uganda
Telecom Limited (UTL) and privatize 51 percent of UTL.
Only after considering various policy options did the government announce  its
decision to license two operators for basic services, UTL and a second network.  At the
same time the potential  for competition was increased with the licensing of a private
cellular operator, Celtel, in 1994; UPTC had no cellular service (see Table 1). The26
prospects  for competition were further enlarged  that year with the license of Starcom,  a
privately operated company offering private voice and data services, public payphones
and trunked radio service.  In  1995 the government began the process of privatizing
UPTC, now UTL, and selling the second license by hiring IFC as financial advisor.
The objectives of the reform, as detailed  in the Uganda Communications  Act
(1997) focus on removing  a bottleneck to business, reducing the scope of government
activity, and encouraging competition.  Paraphrasing,  the objectives in the Act were the
following:
1.  Enhancing the coverage of communications  services and products;
2.  Modernizing  and expanding postal and telecommunications  services;
3.  Reducing  government's  direct role as an operator in the sector;
4.  Encouraging private sector participation;
5.  "Introducing,  encouraging and enabling competition in the sector through
regulation and licensing competitive operators to achieve rapid network
expansion, standardization  as well as operation of competitively priced,
quality services;" (Government of Uganda 1997)
6.  Minimizing all direct and indirect government subsidies to the sector;
7.  Establishing  a fund for rural communications  development.
As this list suggests,  universal service,  in the sense of telephone service for any
one who wants to purchase  it, was not the objective, but rather universal access, in theTable 1.  Timeline of Uganda Telecommunications  Sector Reforms
Retonns  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
1. CIT submitted its recommendation  for telecom reform  (a)  l_  ___
2. Workshop held to discuss the CIT's recommendation  _  __  __
3. Government White Paper prepared (b)  _  _
First  a  r  vate Cellular Operator  and payphone  service provider licensed (CelTel  and
5. Draft policy options paper officially submitted to the GOU  _____
6. The GOU communicated  its policy option decision (c)  _  _
7. Paging Services  Ltd. Started operation
8. A number of minor licenses issued (mobile,  VAS, etc.  )J_  L-
9. Starcom started operation  _
10. CelTel started Operation  __  _  _  -
11.  The privatization process of  UTL was started by hiring the IFC as Financial  Advisor  _  _  _  __
12. UTL slated for privatization  for the first time
13.  The GOU announced  upcoming opportunities in UTL to investors  _  _  _1_-
14. Seminar and Investor  Forum held in Washington, D.C. and Kampala,  respectively.
15. Five Bidding Consortia pre-qualified  for the SNO license
16. Regulatory Consultants hired
17. Communications Act passed  by Parliament  __  _
18. The GOU announced that two consortia had submitted bids for the SNO license
19. The GOU announced that MTN won the SNO license
20. UTL was incorporated
21.  Information  Memorandum and bidder pre-qualification  document  for UTL issued
22. Financial  Restructuring of UTL approved
23. Final negotiations with the SNO (MTN) completod
24. MTN was awardod the operator license
25. Pre  tnualified  bidder for UTL a  fproved  a
26. Parliament suspended the  Drivatiion  aronram of  l  TL when onglay e bodder emeryed
2  4.  Ime  dit  rcepeal of  the  eeaecom  maraysla,  worid toel an  i  askateli
Iner "tol(o  'tfie  2t1time), but it  did not materialize.  A  M
28. The GOU put UTL for sale for the  3od time
29.  UTL  successfudly sold to a TelecelUDetecon consortium  _
(a) The recomPendaprons of  the  Conaiittee on InvesTirent  in ThieconJnunicar4ons (C  o  include the following:
1. Opening the Tlecom Sector to private investmnt as SoOn as possible and privatizing the incumbent
2.  Retention of monopoly on core services for at least  10 years and lhbeialization  of  the non-core  ones
3.  Splitting the Post and Telecom  Divisions and estabtishrnent of a  regulatoTy  body
4.  Inmrndiate repeat of the existing  law and settirng up of a re  gulatory  body to facilitiite the  lhberalization process,  and
5.  Valuation  of the  assets and business of UPTC
(b)  The White Paper was desigrted based on the CIT Report and the January 1994 Workshop. The paper was prepared for the Cabirnet but renmained uiipublishedL
(c)  The GOU decided to license  an SNO  to compete head to head with UTL.sense of providing conveniently accessible communication services.  The Uganda
Communications  Act,  1997,  provides for the creation of a fund to promote rural telephony,
(which we discuss more later).  Universal access called for a more equitable distribution of
lines across regions as an objective, as reflected in the rollout obligations  in the licenses for
the second national operator (SNO) and UTL.  The roll-out obligations by region for the
first five years are given in Table 2 for both UTL and MTN.  The government's goals for
growth outside of  Kampala,  as seen in Table 2, were modest.  The location of some 70,000
out of the required  100,000 total lines was not specified.  The government's pragmatic
approach to access issues can be seen in its negotiations with the SNO.  Initially the rollout
requirements for the SNO were identical to those proposed for UTL (EFC  1  997b).  Table 2
shows that the actual obligations negotiated in the license of the winning bidder (MTN)
were for a lower number of new lines but with a larger proportion of new capacity outside
of Kampala (45 percent compared to one third for UTL).  MTN also agreed to connect  a
payphone to all 33 district capitals and every one of  the 200 country headquarters  that had
electricity and road access to the site.
Table 2. Uganda: Network Roll-out  Obligations for MTN and UTL
Region  SNO  Of  which,  UTL  Ofwhich,
subscriber  public  subscriber  public
lines  payphones  lines  payphones
Kampala  Area  48,702  643  10,000  1,000
Central  13,885  437  5,000  500
Eastern  16,122  495  6,000  600
Northern  3,962  129  3,000  300
Western  6,934  296  6,000  600
Total Restricted Obligations  89,605  2,000  30,000  3,000
Unrestricted  Obligations  0  0  70,000  0
TOTAL  89,605  2,000  100,000  3,000
Sources:  SNO  from MTN license,  Annex 3.  UTL from IFC.  Information Memorandum.  Sale of UTL1997.29
Improvement in service quality was another objective.  For example, both operators
were required to increase local call completion rates from 50 percent the first year of the
license to 85 percent by year five.  The percentage of faults cleared within 24 hours was to
rise from 50 percent in year one to 85 percent by year five.  Digitalization was required to
rise to 95 percent by year five in both networks, and the maximum time to connect a
subscriber in an urban area was to go from four months in year one to two weeks by year
five.
The realism reflected in the government's objectives bolsters the earlier observation
that residential access to telecommunications  outside of Kampala was not a matter of high
political saliency in Uganda.  Rather the Museveni  administration was focusing on practical
matters of how to remove a bottleneck to further investment and growth.
(ii) The Transactions. Government's  initial plan was to sell the license  for the SNO
first, since there were some doubts about whether the second network would attract any
bidders if UTL were sold first.  Parliament, however,  successfully argued that UTL would
lose value if the SNO license were sold first, a position it reportedly adopted after lobbying
by UTL union officials concerned that the SNO might quickly eclipse UPTC in size.
Parliament inserted a clause in the 1997 Communications Act that required  the simultaneous
sale of the two licenses.
In the event, however,  the time consuming process of incorporating UTL and sorting
out its finances and worker relations delayed the UTL sales process to the point where the
government requested and Parliament agreed to allow the SNO sale to proceed.
Government also argued that it needed the proceeds from the sale of the SNO license to pay
redundant UTL workers.  This change in the Act supports our earlier argument that the30
political clout of the UPTC workers was limited and that reform was feasible because
Museveni could win support of the other decision making bodies.
Accordingly,  the government proceeded to sell the SNO license in 1998.  Five firms
prequalified to bid, and two  firms participated in the auction.10 The SNO license was sold
through a unique bidding procedure  designed to secure the government's  dual goals of a
good price and rapid rollout while  discouraging bidders from inflating their promises  of
expansion beyond what they could deliver.  Bids had two equally weighted parts, the first
was simply the price for the second  license and the second was the promised rollout of lines
over the next five years.  There was a minimum rollout of 50,000 lines, with a certain
percentage  to each region,  set in the bidding documents.  Mobile Telephone Networks of
South Africa (MTN) won with a bid of US$5.6 million for the license, US$500,000  more
than the second bid, and a promised rollout of 89,000 new lines.  The SNO license was
awarded  to MTN in April  1998  (see Time Line).
The incorporation of UTL and the financial restructuring plan, were only finalized in
February  1998, and pre-qualification of four bidders took place  in April of that year. "  I
However,  three of the four bidders dropped out of the final bid, for various reasons.  What is
noteworthy is that none of those who dropped out cited competition from the SNO as one of
their reasons.  The sole remaining bidder, Malaysia  Telecom, offered a politically
10  The five consortia  that prequalified  were:  MTN (Mobile Telephone Networks of South Africa); Portugal
Telecommunications  International  (Utelnet); Uganda Communications (Mobile  Systems International,
Vodfone, Telenor, Teledev,  Commonwealth Development Corporation,  and Starlight Communications
Uganda); Newtel  (IPS, Nexus of France Telecom, and ATI Inc.);  and Telkom South Africa.  The auction
pIarticipants  were MTN and Utelnet.
The four consortia that prequalified for UTL were:  Telecom Malaysia Berhad, Telkom South Africa;
consortium of Portugal Telecom,  the Agha Khan Fund Economic Development,  and Alta Telecom;  and a
consortium of WorldTel and Detecon.
12 Portual Telecom's consortium declined because it had committed to an opportunity  in  South Africa;
Worldtel's consortium declined because the lead technical partner, Detecon,  failed to commit the required  30
percent equity for five years; and Telekom South Africa  declined because  of country  risks, the lack of a
functioning regulator and concern over the financial status of UTL.31
unacceptable price of $1 1 million, and also asked for changes in the license that would have
affected the structure of the market.  The government suspended negotiations,  and in August
1998 the Parliament, concerned with corrupt practices in other transactions, suspended all
privatization  activity.  Eventually the UTL transaction was explicitly exempted  from this
ban and the Government,  anxious for a sale, agreed to the use of a "fast-track" procedure for
the second round (field interviews).  Under this procedure the government attempted to drum
up interest in UTL and from previous interested parties, and accepted fresh bids from three
bidders in October 1998, but again none of the bids were acceptable.13
A third attempt at selling UTL was mounted  late 1999 attracting 3 bidders and ended
with the sale of 51% of the shares to a consortium of Detecon (Germany),  Telecel Intl.
(Swiss/Congo) and Orascom (Egypt) for US $33.5 million.  The sale was widely viewed as
exemplary of an honest and very successful transaction.  The sales price was higher than in
any previous bid.  Several factors may account for the higher price.  One is that the regulator
had now been operating for 20 months, and potential bidders could assess its personnel and
view the degree of its independence  from politics, and assess its track record with the
private second operator.  This was reinforced by the fact that government had demonstrated
that it was going to stay out of regulatory issues unless its input was specifically sought by
the regulator.  There are instances where operators had earlier attempted to bypass the
regulator in the hitherto traditional way by going directly to the Minister regarding
regulatory issues.  The Minister in all cases refused to intervene.
Another factor is that MTN and Celtel's experience to date showed that there was
much higher potential demand in Uganda than estimated earlier. As we discuss in more
13 Two of the three bidders (Portugal Telecom, Norstrad  and WorldtelUDetecon)  asked  for delays, and eventually dropped
out,  The remaining bidder, WorldtelUDetecon,  offered US$23 million  for 51% of UTL,  however,  it didn't materialize at32
detail below, in less than a year MTN put in place a cellular network that is two thirds the
size of UTL, with 36,500 subscribers.  Meanwhile, the existing cellular company,  Celtel,
has grown to 20,000 subscribers,'4 and a number of value added, equipment and internet
providers have emerged.  The third factor is that for the first time in a very long time, UTL
declared a profit during  1999, making it more valuable  as a going concern.
Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, the sale of UTL proved to be more valuable
and viable into a competitive market than before competition was in place.  And, also
contrary to practice in many countries, delaying a sale until the regulatory body is up and
running provides important comfort to bidders, that may make up for the cost of delay.
this time as the consortium fell apart when Worldtel failed  to produce its share of the funds.
14  Some competitors claim that this overstates Celtel's actual subscriber base, but it is generally accepted that
Celtel grew rapidly after MTN began operations.  Celtel had 5,000 customers at the end of 1997.33
V.  The Regulatory Framework
According to Noll  1999, an effective regulatory system is one that is:
(a)  independent of day-to-day political  pressures;
(b) ruled by a clear legislative mandate  to assure that service is provided thorough a
competitive market to as many people as possible at prices that fairly reflect the
cost of service;
(c)  operated by a regulatory authority that has the skills and budget to operate
competently;
(d) transparent in its decision making process,  as well as in its rules and policies;
(e) open to participation by all those who are significantly affected by a regulatory
decision;
(f)  subject to a mechanism to advocate  competition in the regulatory process, such
as a competition  agency; and,
(g) subject to formal review by the judiciary and the statutory authority.
As we shall show, Uganda has met some of these criteria, but others are not well
established.  This section first considers how the regulatory framework  looks on the
statue books and then how it has operated  in practice.
(i) The Regulatory Framework in the Statute.  The regulatory framework on the
books in Uganda seems in principle well designed to promote competition.  The relevant
laws and licenses create two bodies designed to have the power and mandate to assure fair
competition.  The first is the Uganda Communications  Commission (UCC), created under
the Uganda Communications  Act,  1997, with the power to promote competition  and to
regulate  interconnection (see Table 3 for a list of its functions).  The UCC has independent34
funding from licensing and spectrum  fees.  It also has a levy on the gross revenues of the
operators (not to exceed 2.5 percent; currently  1%) which is set aside in full for rural
communications  development.  It may also receive money from the government budget or
borrow, but this has not been necessary to date.  The Commission is designed to be
professional; of its seven members, three are nominated by various professional  groups,
while the commissioners nominate their full-time executive director;  all are appointed by the
Minister.15
The law gives the UCC considerable authority to enforce its powers independently.
All licensees must submit an annual report according to the UCC format, and the UCC can
inspect their premises  and logbooks, reports, data records, apparatus, and the like. The UCC
can also modify any condition of a license; fine an operator up to  10 percent of its gross
operating revenue, or suspend or revoke its licenses for breach of the license conditions,
fraud, or similar violations.  The UCC has the power to regulate tariffs and interconnection,
and can impose default interconnection  agreements if companies  fail to reach agreement.
The commission  can investigate apparent cases of unfair competition  and require the
operators  to pay a fine or declare  any anti-competitive  contract null and void.
'5 Three of the members  are recommended  by the Institution of Professional  Engineers, the Uganda  Law
Society, the Broadcasting Council respectively;  the chair and two other "eminent persons" are decided on by
the Minister; the UCC itself recommends  the Executive Director to the Minister.  The appointment of the
members  other than the Executive Director are subject to Cabinet approval.35
Table 3. Principal Functions of the Uganda Communications Commission
(adapted from the Uganda  Communications Act,  1997)
1.  To monitor, inspect,  license and regulate communications  services; to allocate and license the use of
radio frequency spectrum;  and to make recommendations to the Minister in relation to the issuance of
major licenses a  and to supervise and enforce the conditions of these licenses;
2.  To establish a tariff system to protect consumers  from excessive tariff increases and avoid unfair tariff
competition;
3.  To draw up, establish,  amend and enforce  a national numbering  plan;
4.  To conduct (or authorize any person to conduct) technical evaluations relating  to communications
services;
5.  To set national communications  standards and to ensure compliance with national and international
standards;
6.  To establish and run frequency  and other monitoring stations;
7.  To receive and investigate complaints  relating to communications services and to take necessary
action;
8.  To promote the interests of  consumers and operators as regards the quality of conmnunications  services
and equipment;
9.  To improve communications services generally and to ensure equitable distribution of services
throughout the country;
10.  To ensure that basic network operators provide leased lines for value added and other services as may
be appropriate;
11.  To safeguard the rights of operators and enforce the performance of their obligations;
12.  To grant operators'  rights to utilize public rights  of way and to co-ordinate  with relevant bodies to
effect compulsory purchase  or use of private property;
13.  To promote competition,  including the protection of operators from acts and practices of other
operators that are damaging to competition and to facilitate the entry into markets of new and modem
systems and services.
14.  To regulate interconnection and access systems between operators and users.
a Major licenses include provision of local,  long distance or intemational  telephone services,  trunk capacity resale, rural
telecommunications,  store and forwarding messaging, cellular or mobile services.
The second body safeguarding competition is the Uganda Communications Tribunal,
which is designed to be a neutral oversight body that offers a process for dispute resolution.
Aggrieved operators and others affected by the Communications Act can appeal the UCC or
Minister's decisions to the Tribunal.  It can thus protect the operators from abuse of36
government power or favoritism to one operator,  as well  as from foul play by other
operators.  The Tribunal will consist of a judge,  chairperson, and two other persons
recommended by the Judicial Service Commission and appointed by the President, along
with up to four technical advisors appointed by the Tribunal.  The Tribunal has the powers
of the High Court and follows the same procedures,  and its decisions can be appealed to the
Court of Appeal.  It must be noted however that Uganda does not yet have any specific laws
governing competition and clearly spelling out what would be anti-competitive practices in
the general  sense.  As of September 2000, however, the Tribunal had not been constituted.
In field interviews government officials stated that such a tribunal was expensive to
maintain, and reported that there were suggestions  that the Tribunal should be an ad hoc and
not a standing body to minimize frivolous  complaints.
Besides these pro-competition bodies,  several clauses in the 1997 Act are
specifically  directed at the protection of competition.  These include prohibitions against
unfair practices,  such as abuse of a dominant position to exclude or limit competition,  or
changes in the market structure that would stifle competition, for example anti-competitive
mergers.  The Act also prohibits UTL or its affiliates, shareholders  or related companies
from acquiring  a direct or indirect ownership  stake (more than 50 percent) in the SNO,  and
vice versa.
Before UTL was sold the regulator was in an ambiguous position, since the second
operator could claim  that the playing field was not really level as long as one of the parties
was state owned.  In addition, the other large private sector operator,  Celtel, did not fall
under the same regulatory regime.  It also meant that the regulation had not really been
tested, since UTL was not able to react to the incentives  in the regulatory framework  as a37
privately owned incumbent would.  Nevertheless  some early weak and strong points can be
identified.  These will affect the sustainability of competition.
(ii) Regulation in Practice.  Some early weaknesses  in the regulatory  framework are
now apparent.  In addition, several points of contention have arisen, not surprisingly in
interconnection  and technology.  There are however also some strong points to note.
Weakness  in the regulatory framework could also threaten competition.  In many
ways the UCC is a well designed regulator.  It has wide ranging powers of information
gathering, investigation, and action and a strong mandate to protect competition.  The high
caliber of its members and staff and an early reputation for being impartial and fair are also
strengths.  One potential weakness is its vulnerability to politically motivated interference.
Although the UCC has considerable powers,  it is not fully independent of the Ministry.
Major licenses are approved by the Minister on the recommendation  of UCC; the UCC
budget must be approved by the Minister; and the law specifically allows the Minister to
give the Commission "guidelines on sector policy."  This could open the door for political
intervention in the Commission.
We must state here that establishing a tradition of regulatory independence  is often
as important  as the statute.  A critical aspect in creating a culture of regulatory independence
is that government must avoid flouting the law, and using technicalities to interfere in the
regulatory processes for political or personal interest.  The practice so far in Uganda is that
this tradition is being built up.  There is no single instance to date where government has
intervened in the regulatory process without the specific invitation of the commission; and
this has been in regard to major licenses as required by the law, or relating to decisions prior
to the establishment of the commission.  The minister responsible has indeed had occasion38
to protect the commission from interference from other ministers.  This tradition will
hopefully gain full hold.
Financial dependence on government is also a common  channel for applying
political pressure on regulators.  To date, UCC has not had to get any money for its
operations  from the government budget.  The only exception are inherited liabilities
(resulting from the original split of UPTC) that the commission feels government should
fund so that the Rural Communications Development Fund (obtained from the approved  1%
levy) is not spent on settling inherited liabilities.  The rural fund for telecommunications
may provoke political intervention in UCC as well.  The Communications  Act is vague on
how the fund will be administered and what criteria will be used to determine allocations.
The general intent is to give the existing operators the right of first refusal and then auction
access to the fund and to give priority to public payphones, but these are not yet spelled out
in law.  Since the amounts could be relatively large, the temptation  to direct the fund to meet
political ends is likely to be high.
Thus far, an important source of strength in Uganda's regulatory framework has
been government's  general concern to maintain its credibility with private investors.  As
long as this commitment is sustained, it will limit the extent of political intervention  in the
regulatory framework.  However,  experience elsewhere suggests that institutionalized
independence is an important corollary to government's  generalized concerns with
reputation.
Interconnection is usually a major issue in competitive  systems and Uganda is no
exception.  This issue first came to a head over the interconnection rates in Celtel's
agreement with UTL (then still UPTC). UTL reportedly signed the 1993  agreement only39
under pressure by the ministry because of management's view that interconnection  rates for
national calls favored Celtel because  Celtel received higher interconnection prices than did
UTL (field interviews).' 6 Under the  1993 agreement, when a national  call originated  in
Celtel's network and terminated in UTL's, Celtel would pay UTL  17 percent of Celtel's
tariff; whereas,  when a national call originated in UTL's network and terminated in Celtel's,
UTL would pay Celtel 90 percent of Celtel's tariff. 1 7 The effect of this price imbalance on
UTL grew over time as a traffic imbalance emerged.  In the early years of Celtel's
operations, the national traffic exchanged by Celtel and UTL was nearly balanced.  But by
the middle of 1996,  the traffic began shifting so that by 1998, UTL customers were
terminating  two national calls in Celtel's network for every one call Celtel's customers  were
terminating in UTL's network.
Interconnection rates for international  calls also moved in a direction that was
perceived as adverse to UTL.  In the 1993  agreement, Celtel had to pay UPTC  70 percent of
its published tariffs for calls originating in Celtel's network (rates were between US$0.83
and US$3.10 in  1995 when Celtel began operating).  UTL would pay Celtel US$0.27 a
minute for calls from outside Uganda that terminated in Celtel's network.  However, these
rates quickly became burdensome for UTL as its international  tariffs declined (to US$0.57
from US$1.78 by 1998).  International traffic flow accentuated  the adverse effect of UTL's
price change.  From the time Celtel started operating in  1995 to  1998, an average of 68
percent of international traffic between the two networks has been from UTL to Celtel.
16 The default agreement provides  for operators to pay for originating  calls on each others'  networks, but this
feature  is missing from agreements actually in effect.
17 In existing  interconnection  agreements  in Uganda,  interconnection  is paid only for terminating  calls,
although the regulations include default interconnections  agreements  (imposed when parties fail to reach
agreement) that also charge for interconnection of originating  calls.  The agreement in question between
UPTC and Celtel calls upon UPTC to set a maximum tariff for callers  from its network to Celtel of (0.90 x
Celtel tariff)x  1.39.40
From UTL's perspective,  the net effect of  the national and international
interconnection  prices and the traffic imbalance was to cause UTL to lose money from its
interconnection  with Celtel. UTL met extensively with Celtel to try to change the agreement
and then suspended payment for two years until the Minister intervened and forced UTL to
pay.  Subsequently, UTL again suspended payment and demanded a new agreement.  After
MTN entered the market,  both Celtel and UTL signed interconnection agreements  with
MTN on very different terms from the one they shared.  As can be seen in Table 4, the other
interconnection  agreements  show much greater reciprocity.
Table 4. Uganda: Interconnections Charges
(US Cents per rminute)
92000  Apri-01 '  # Inc (Dec) 00199
Calls  . U7L. Coliel  MTN  UTL  I  Celtel  MTN  UTL'  UTL  Celtel  MTN' |MTN  UTL  Celtel  MTh
Calls from  UTL  M1  _6  Ml  (1  (1  7
Calls fromn  UTLII  1  3  3  17.1  =  (19)  1
Calls from Celtel  3.24  =  3  =  n  M  (62)
CdisfmmMT4.0  23N46'  mEm  a
Calls fom MTNm  4.d  23.46 
Natonal  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I
Cells from UTL _'-3  m(9 
Callsfrom UTLm_  1.6=5  Z  =  t  °(9  1
Calls from Ceitel  j3.24  (62)_
Calls from MTN  4'00  2346  1  E
Cas  bfom MTNm  4.0d  3346  r  -
Intematonal (US &  UK)  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
Calls from UTL  _  :  5_'lp  a(7
Callsfrom  UL__  a 
Calls trom  Celtel  84.00  E  I  H
Calls from  MTN  9333  N/A
Source: Ceftel,  MTN and  UTL Interconect Ageements
Note:  Average  exdege  rates  of  Ush  1,500.  Ush  1.800  tOd Ush  1.800  per  USS  have  been  used  for 199. 2000  and  2001,  respedtky.
:  F =  Fhced  and  M  - Moboe
a.  The  Interconneoion  charg  is  90%  of  Coels tafrt which  is  pegged  to  USD.
b.  Ush  54  (US  Cerds  3.93)  for  eoenomy  and  Ush  27  (US  Cenrs  1.98)  for super  econorny  depending  sn bre of  the day.
c.  The  folonnedin charge  bi  17n  p  of  Cfero tsrtff awhich  is  pegged  to  USD.
d.  Ush  33  (US  Cens 2.34)  foreconomy and  Ush  18  (US  Cents  1.32)  forsuper ecororoydepending on  te  ofdthe  day.
e.  The  interconnecion charge  Is  70%  of UTts tariff.
r Average  mte.  Rotes  rnge from  Ush  1800  (US  Cents  132.16)  to  Ush  1150  (US  Cents  84.43)  depending  onthe destlnabtn country.
g.  Cdtel doesnl route  bt  Incoming  intemetionat  traftc thnugh MTN's  intemetionat  gateway.
h.  The  dchrge  applies  for  inteanl outgong troSc.  The  Interconnecdn  charge  for  incoming  trtoc is  3t%  of IntematIonal  Acunting Rate.
1.  The  nteDonnetrion  darge  tor Cetl -MTN  hfixd terninated  cal cats  is US Cents  4.44,  and  the  charge  for  MTN -UTL  fbed to  Itedcas is USS  Cents  5.00.41
Table 5: Comparison of Fixed Termination Interconnection Charges (1999)
(US Cents per minute)
Courtry  Oprao  Local  DLD  Average
UK  BT  0.85  1.29  0.94
Netherlands  KPN  1.40  1.71  1.46
Australia  Telstra  1.30  2.23  1.49
Greece  P&T  1.57  2.24  1.70
Sweden  Telia  1.70  2.11  1.78
Chile  CTC  1.78  1.78  1.78
Denmark  TeleDenmark  1.95  2.30  2.02
Belgium  Belgacom  2.16  2.85  2.30
Bolivia  Entel  2.31  2.31  2.31
New Zealand  TCNZ  2.35  2.35  2.35
Japan  NTT  2.15  3.27  2.37
Italy  Telecom  Italy  2.23  3.04  2.39
Mexico  Telmex  2.60  2.60  2.60
Argenitina  Telefonica  3.35  3.50  3.37
Average  1.98  2.40  2.06
Uganda (i  9s)  UTL  3.99  3.99  3.99
Urganda  as %/  Ot sample
average (99)  202  166  194
Source:  Briceno, Arturo; Intemational  Comparison  Study about  Interconnecabon Charges,  OSIPTEL  Peru, 1999
Various Interconnect Agreements,  Uganda
Note:  DLD  = Domestic Long  Distance
Initially, the arrival of the UCC on the scene did not make an appreciable difference
in the dispute between UTL and Celtel.  The Commission was reluctant to impose the
default interconnection agreement,  which is seen as harsh, on the parties (field interviews).
So far UCC, has not had to call upon the force of the law to get disputes settled.  The
established tradition now is that all stakeholders  are given a chance to have their say before
decisions are made.  UCC has presided over many meetings to iron out disputes between
service providers, especially the major ones.
As of November  1999 a new agreement was being finalized under which Celtel
would pay Ush 200 per minute for national calls that terninate in UTL's network and UTL
would pay Celtel 250 for calls terminating in Celtel's network.  It would also change the
international charges, particularly for calls from East Africa.  This agreement was
concluded, but it did not cover the issue of the proposed UTL mobile network, which both42
parties agreed to handle in due course.  The situation still obtains at the end of the current
study period.  The operators were given a ninety-day deadline that is almost expiring to
resolve the interconnect agreement.  The new UTL management want a comprehensive
renegotiation because they feel that what was arrived at by previous management  is not fair
to UTL.  Celtel is insisting on looking only at the UTL mobile interconnect.  Every
indication is that UCC will have to formally intervene.
The MTN:UTL interconnection agreement took six months to work out, but was
resolved with charges that are likely to be sustainable  since it was mutually agreed,
reciprocal  and low compared to past standards in Uganda (see Table 4).  It will be noted
from the current rates that calling from either network outside-peak times is the same for
inter and intra-network traffic.  It should be observed that the current size of both networks
makes it mutually beneficial to be reasonable  about the interconnect agreement.  Similarly,
MTN and Celtel have concluded on the interconnect rates on a reciprocal basis, with the
exception of international  traffic which Celtel cannot route.  An interesting regulatory issue
has arisen with regard to international  traffic.  Celtel cannot handle it directly, which means
they have to use either UTL or MTN.  Since this does not guarantee either of them carriage
of the traffic,  UCC has argued that Celtel could as well switch its international traffic
through another party.  This decision  is to be incorporated in the revised Celtel license.  This
way, Celtel can offer more competitive  international rates.
UCC's approach to interconnection  to date has been to try to allow the operators to
resolve the issues, and give them 90 day deadlines for doing so with implicit rather than
specific threats.  As Noll 2000  found in Mexico, since interconnection inherently causes
disputes between carriers, bilateral negotiation  does not work well and the "presupposition43
in favor of negotiation  simply causes delay."(p.20).  The UTL-Celtel case demonstrates this.
A second problem is that carriers may treat the interconnection prices as a floor on usage
prices, and this reduces the effects of competition.  Table 5 suggests that interconnection
prices in Uganda are high by international  standards, which means that usage prices will
start from a high floor.
Other disputes have not been resolved.  UTL was not required to comply with
MTN's request for more than one point of interconnection in Kampala,  apparently because
of physical constraints in its outmoded network, nor did it have to let MTN put in equipment
to improve the interconnection.
Both Celtel and MTN have experienced  capacity restrictions on their
interconnections  with UTL. Celtel's constraints stem  from the disagreement  about rates,
while MTN's are due to its own mistakes in underestimating  demand, as well as UTL's
limited connection  capacity. These capacity constraints have made it difficult to complete
calls between networks,  which has created the impression in the minds of some customers
that Celtel and MTN provide a service that is inferior to UTL's service (field interviews).
Interconnection  disputes are likely to increase and become even more acerbic after
UTL is privatized.  Experience  elsewhere suggests that private operators have a stronger
incentive to try to put rivals at a competitive disadvantage  since they directly benefit from
profitability.  Moreover, UTL's management was hampered in responding to competition by
the Ministry; many decisions were outside their hands.  As the newly private UTL adds
capacity,  new issues will arise with important implications for competition,  such as whether
new investment will reduce congestion that most affects other operators and whether44
additional points of interconnection  will be allowed.  The sustainability of competition in
Uganda telecommunications  will depend on how the UCC resolves these issues.
Technology.  Another area of potential problems for UCC is the legal treatment of
new technologies.  Rapid technological  change has challenged many regulatory  frameworks
and Uganda is no exception.  One manifestation of this is the ambiguity of treatment of
MTN in the license and subsequent regulatory decisions.  MTN's system is entirely cellular
and according to its license cellular telephone rates are not regulated, but voice telephone
rates are regulated, "whether by fixed or wireless technology."  The government has decided
that fixed wireless prices are regulated;  fixed wireless includes business services for large
buildings and residential cellular phones that are not mobile.  In effect this could mean that
all MTN rates are regulated,  since the distinction between fixed wireless and mobile is
vague and very difficult or costly for a regulator to verify.  The UCC has already received  a
number of complaints about the statute's treatment of fixed cellular.
Another ambiguity has arisen over whether mobile phones count as subscriber lines
for the purposes of MTN's rollout agreement.  The Government (and hence the regulator)
have not clearly defined what constitutes  a "line" in the face of changing technology.  This
is very important to MTN, which had to put up a bond worth $20 for each promised  line ($5
million in total) with the understanding that the money would be returned to them when they
met the obligation.  In 1999 they asked to be reimbursed for the lines they had connected  to
date but the government was unsure whether a cellular subscriber should be counted as a
"line" and was delaying payment.  The UCC has been trying to make the regulation
"technology  neutral" and has agreed with the operators that there will be an annual review45
of definitions like subscriber lines to take into account changing technology.  UCC is also
considering a scheme to define differences in lines only in terms of the quality and grade of
service.  Under this definition, if, for example,  the mobile cellular grade and quality of
service is improved to some agreed levels, cellular subscribers, through suitable factors,
could be counted as part of the obligatory roll out.
A third illustrative ambiguity relates to what are called "satellite"  services in the
licenses.  While MTN was rolling out their cellular network towards North Western
Uganda, targeting the prosperous community in the area bordering Congo and Sudan, Celtel
established a VSAT link and launched their services in Arua ahead of MTN.  MTN lodged a
formal complaint that Celtel was not allowed to offer "satellite services".  Several meetings
could not resolve the issue of differing interpretations of "satellite  services"  and "links".
The compromise was a formal suspension of Celtel's plans to reach other areas via VSAT,
but permitting them to maintain their link to Arua.  This issue must necessarily be revisited
by UCC for formal resolution.
Neutral oversight mechanisms act as a buffer against abuse of power by the
regulator or government and increase the credibility of the regulatory contract and the
chance that it will be sustained.  Although legal resolution of disputes is usually a last resort,
the presence of a credible threat of legal redress acts as a check on all actors, including
government actors. Uganda's Tribunal has not started operating yet and it is too early to
know if it will be a source of strength or weakness.  On the pro side, the specification of
procedures for appeal beyond the Minister is a safeguard in and of itself.  The way members
are appointed (recommended by judicial commission, appointed by President) increases the
likelihood that the Tribunal will be objective.  Does a specialized  body such as the Tribunal46
improve oversight and dispute resolution?  Uganda's High Court was reported in field
interviews to be reasonably objective  and independent  of the government, but weak in
enforcing its decisions;  lower courts were reported to be vulnerable  to corruption.
The Tribunal has no advantage  over conventional courts in enforcing  its decisions,
but Tribunal members will have an emptier docket and will therefore be able to respond to
complaints much faster than a regular commercial court.  Since their only focus is
telecommunications,  they could become better informed about the industry than a general
court, important where technology is changing rapidly. On the con side it could be unwieldy
and expensive to convene this special court just for telecommunications  disputes; (there is
discussion underway about folding it into a multi-sector Tribunal to serve a proposed  public
utilities commission).
To date, the Uganda  Communications Tribunal  has not been established, and
indications from government are still that it might not be established.  It is argued that in the
interim, the constitution  permits all entities to appeal  to the High Court on any issue.
Operations and Transparency of the Regulator.
Price  Regulation. While there is provision for tariff regulation, there has been no
intervention by UCC.  The effect of competition to date has been a continuous decrease  in
tariffs in real terms (pegging to the dollar).  UCC has decided that so long as market forces
are doing the job, they will not intervene.  This is also to UCC's advantage  because  it has
not yet built up the capacity for tariff regulation.  There are complaints on record of under
pricing by MTN with Celtel  as the complainant.  UCC has had to rely on defense by the
accused party to take a decision.  UCC lacks the capacity,  so far, to carry out its own47
independent  assessment.  The same goes for regulatory accounting.  The newly approved
organizational structure combined with intensive training is going to develop expertise in
this area.
Operators  'Reports: UCC is just learning that operators do not necessarily comply
with reporting  requirements.  For the first time, it has specifically raised the threat of
penalties for failure to comply.  It must also be stated that UCC has not yet fully grasped the
why of reporting  in terms of building up sector performance  indicators.  This means that
there is no well-defined  format in place for the reports.  A well defined format  can only be
produced with clear knowledge  of what information  is required from reports.  Without clear
objectives, reporting becomes simply a data collection exercise.
Public  Interaction and Transparency:  UCC has initiated public consultative
workshops  on important issues, to hear from operators and consumers on major issues.  One
major issue has been the Rural Communications Development Fund (policy and strategies)
where two public workshops have been held.  Another is the national  internet exchange
point where stakeholders  were convened by UCC so that they set up a joint non-exclusive
venture to establish an IXP.  A third important effort was a full day workshop aimed at
simply hearing from service providers and the consumers, and  also setting up a public forum
for service providers to hear from consumers.  UCC has also publicized its licensing
procedures,  including timing for public advertisement  and comment or reaction to any
application.  UCC has however never held a formal public hearing,  and indeed has not yet
established procedures  for such a hearing.  It also has not, despite earlier enthusiasm and
proposals by Commissioners,  ever held a public Commission meeting.48
License and  spectrum  fees:  License fees and spectrum  fees have not yet been
rationalized,  again due to limited internal capacity.  The process to outsource this review is
underway.  The general view is that all charges should be kept to the minimum consistent
with regulatory costs and acceptable build up of the rural communications  fund.  It is
believed that excessive charges would only be passed on to users,  slowing sector growth.
Organizational  structure  and employee benefits: UCC has been set up as a modem
organization compatible with the telecommunications  sector.  While there are a few
members of staff with telecommunications  experience,  emphasis is on identifying bright
young people who will be properly and fully trained in the different aspects of regulation.  It
is inevitable that there will be limited capacity  for the initial period, but this should be
overcome within two to five years.  All employment  is on contract (two years apart from the
Executive Director who has a statutory  five years), renewable based on performance.
Benefits are generally in line with the benefits of employees  in the sector in Uganda.  The
organization has remained lean and flat.
In summary, it has to be recognized that the regulator  still has a lot of
organizational  weaknesses, but has two major strong  points: a growing track record of
fairness and transparent  methods of work; and a growing tradition of  non-interference  from
government.
Privatization of UTL.  The privatization of UTL has increased competitive
pressures in the Uganda market.  This was clearly evidenced by the launch of UTL's mobile
network.  Two weeks prior to the launch, MTN launched a major publicity and promotional
campaign,  offering a package of a SIM card,  service fee for one month, some air time, and a
handset for shs 140,000 (1$=shs  1,800).  UTL launched their network with a similar49
package  at shs 120,000 and no service fee for 5 months (compared to MTN's shs 18,000 and
CelTel's shs 17,500 per month).  CelTel offered the package at shs 160,000,  and now debits
the monthly service fee to customer's  credit on a per day basis rather than as a lump sum.
More recently,  UTL advertised a new package:  a dual band set for shs 120,000,  inclusive of
shs 8,000 air time and a SIM card.  MTN then advertised exactly the same set at shs
115,000,  inclusive of 10,000 shs airtime and shs 18,000 service  fee and a SIM card.  (UTL
currently does not charge a service fee).  CelTel offered the same set and a similar package
at shs 110,000.  It remains to be seen if the downward trend in access and usage costs will
continue.  It is nevertheless  remarkable  that a package like this is available in Uganda for
about $60.
As we show in the next section, the government was understandably reluctant to
invest new capital in UTL before it was sold, and service quality was declining.  Although it
had the third cellular license allowed under the exclusivity agreement, it could not move fast
enough to take advantage of this opportunity due to bureaucratic delays in getting the
necessary approvals for major capital expenditure  from the Privatization Unit.  All the
planning was however largely concluded by the time UTL was sold, enabling the privatised
company a comparatively fast launch of the mobile operation.  Similarly, UTL reportedly
had the best sites for payphones but although it accelerated  installation, maintenance of the
phones was poor.
Privatization of UTL has had other beneficial effects on competition besides making
the company a more effective market player.  The clock could only start ticking down the
five-year period of the exclusive duopoly for MTN and UTL after the UTL license was
signed on July 25, 2000.  Privatization has also helped the UCC by resolving its ambiguous50
position vis-a-vis UTL since forcing UTL compliance was really the same as forcing
government compliance,  never an easy job in the developing countries of Africa.  Since
UTL was sold, there have really been no major regulatory issues that can be used to judge
the regulatory trend with more effective competition in the field.  As expected, there have
been cases where UTL and MTN have had a convergence  of views in protecting their
National Operator status.  Both of them,  for example,  do not want Celtel to be given
National Operator status, leading to mandatory right of access to land, even if Celtel is, by
law, a major licensee.  (Celtel is getting a new license reclassifying it as a major licensee
because the Act classifies Cellular licenses as major licenses.  By the same token, they will
have to take on quality and roll out obligations).
While no specific evidence can be cited, the general view in UCC is that the major
operators have all been more reasonable since UTL was privatized.  Maybe the major
concern of all players is competitive positioning.  The rows between service providers have
also reduced with the recognition of mutual commercial  advantage  in sharing facilities  and
improving interconnects.
VI.  Reform Outcomes
This section analyzes the effects of the reform on growth, access, tariffs and the
profitability and productivity of UTL.  Recall that our premise is that competition will spur
expansion of the system, reduce end user tariffs and encourage efficiency.  It seems fair to
say that thus far Uganda has had a reasonably competitive telecommunications  market with
reasonably  effective regulation.  UTL was somewhat hampered in responding  to competitive
pressures from the other two operators because of restraints imposed by the ministry, but as51
the incumbent operator with the lowest cost system, it also had important advantages over
its competitors.
(i) Growth  in Capacity and Access.  There has been a surge in capacity and access,
first with the improvement  of UTL's capacity in preparation  for privatization,  followed  by
the entry of Celtel and MTN.  UTL's active capacity had been flat at around 62,000 local
exchange connection capacity from 1989 to  1993. With the completion of the World Bank
rehabilitation project and the improvement in UTL maintenance,  its capacity began to
improve (Figure  12)  as well as the utilization of available  capacity which increased  from 46%
in the early 1990s to 70% after the completion of the project (IBID).
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The total telephone penetration, main lines and cellular per 100 inhabitants,  also
increased  substantially and the country just crossed  the 1.00 teledensity  level at the end of52
year 2000 (Figure  13).  Therefore, Uganda, which was far below the regional average prior
to reform, caught up with the region after reform.  Assuming no entry and the incumbent's
1990-1999 average teledensity growth rate, the incumbent operator would not have achieved
this level of penetration until 2024.
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At the time of MTN's entry in October 1998, UTL had 55,749 subscribers  and
CelTel had 8,100 wireless subscribers.  A year later, UTL was at still about 55,000, Celtel
had grown to 19,074, while MTN had 53,528 subscribers.  In addition UTL had installed
1,333 payphones and Starcom had 100 (Figure 14).  By the early part of  2001, the telecom
landscape had significantly changed with UTL serving  10,000 new wireless subscribers
although its fixed subscribers did not show an appreciable  change, Celtel and MTN serving
about 32,934 and 149,216 wireless subscribers,  respectively, and Starcom being out of the
market.  Overall, connected customers grew by about 267% in about two and a half year
18A main telephone  line is defined  as a line connecting customer equipment  (e.g. telephone,  fax) to the public switched telephone network
and which has a dedicated port on a telephone exchange.  This category does not include cellular or other wireless  lines.53
after the MTN entry.  Obviously, competition  and the introduction of prepaid  are the main
factors behind this market spur.
Figure 14. Uganda:  Telephones  In Operation
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(ii) Tariffs. UTL's tariffs have decreased,  thanks to the end of pegging to the US
dollar described above,  and rebalancing  in  1994 and again in  1997. As we saw in Figure 6
above, UTL's real international tariffs have dropped sharply.  The average per minute
charge for national long distance calls has also dropped in real terms, while the cost of local
calls went up in  1995, then fell again in 1997(Figure  15).  UTL's one time connection  charge
and monthly subscription  charges, which had been well below the average  for sub-Saharan
Africa, have increased in real terms (Figure  16) and are now above average.19
9  UTL's  1998 monthly subscription charge was $8.06 compared to an average  in 41 Sub-Saharan African
countries of $9.76  for business lines and US$9.12 for residential  (ITU).  Its connection charge  was US$137
compared  to the  regional  average of US$ 108 for business and USS88  for residential  (ITU).54
Figure 15. UTL: Local & National Long Distance Tariffs for Fixed Line Calls
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'National  long distance  is a weighted average of the price per minute for different distances.  Local calls are less than 30 kms.
Figure 16. UTL:  Connection & Monthly  Subscription Charges
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Note:  Connection charge is one time;  subscription charge is monthly.
MTN's per minute tariffs  have not changed much since it entered  the market, when
its rates were competitive with UTL. MTN's per minute rate for domestic calls is the same
as UTL's -- 250 Ush per minute -- while its charge for international  calls -- Ush 2,200 -- is55
above any of UTL's charges  (Table 6).20  There is no connection fee, although in July  1999
MTN added a monthly subscription charge of Ush 18,000 a month for pre-paid customers.
This compares to UTL's subscription charge of about Ush  19,000 a month and Celtel's of
Ush 17,500.  Surprisingly, the service fee has not reduced the cellular growth  for MTN as
earlier expected largely because they have conducted an aggressive network expansion,
adding value for their existing customers:  Most parts of the country can be reached using the
MTN network at the local telephone cost.  This alone has caused some people to migrate
from the CelTel network (field interviews)  forcing CelTel to increase the pace of their
network roll-out.  MTN also appreciated  the big market in SMS and phone email, and
introduced them ahead of its competition.  Cellular competition has had an influence on the
price of a handset, which has fallen from about US$2,000 when Celtel started operations  to
approximately US$100  at the end of 1999.  As stated earlier, one can get a new fully
connected modem dual band set with WAP (even if WAP is not available in Uganda yet) at
$60.  A robust market for used handsets and resale of cellular and payphone usage have also
emerged.
:0 In  1998 UTL charged Ush  1,800  per mninute  to the UK,  most of continental  Europe, US, Canada and Japan,  Ush 1,500  to the COMESA  countries of Africa,
Ush 650 to East Africa and KBO countries, and Ush  2,050 to the rest of AfTica  and the  world.56
Figure 17: Celtel Mobile Local/National  End User Tariffs
(USD per minute;  peak time contract plan tariffs)
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It is interesting to note how Celtel, being the first private entrant, reacted to the
changes in the market structure and changes in interconnection charges over time.  Celtel's
local and national tariffs, which remained unchanged  for almost three years since it started
operation in 1995, dropped by more than 50% at the end of 1997 apparently in response to
the bid conducted for the SNO license (Figure 17).  Tariffs further declined when MTN
started connecting  customers in October 1998.
Celtel's tariffs were also responsive to changes in interconnection charges and were
reflective of the differences  in the magnitude of the charges.  For example, the premium
Celtel customers were paying to call their MTN counterpart compared  to calling UTL can
only be justified by the relatively higher MTN network termination charge  (Table 4).  As
UTL tenmination charges increased and MTN's dropped, Celtel's end user tariffs to these
networks adjusted accordingly  and eventually converged.  This is a practical  example of
the significance of interconnection charges, besides competition,  in pricing end user tariffs.57
Table 6: Comparative End User Telephone  Tariffs and Charges (1999)
In USD)
U  . .f  .klmuo  JU149  Anrl\Of
hPe  UVL F  CeIt  MTN  UTL F  UTL a C*el  r  MTN  W
Local Calls
Calls from  UTL F  0.06  0.48  0.48  0.04  0.12  0.14  0.14  0.14
Calls from UTL M  N/A  N/A  N/A  0.12  0.12  0.17  0.14  0.14
Calls from Celtel  0.21  0.13  0.33  0.18  ??  0.18  0.18  0.18
Calls from MTN F  N/A  N/A  N/A  0.07  0.17  0.17  0.07  0.09
Calls from MTNN  ??  ??  0.18  0.14  ??  0.18  0.12  0.12
Domestic Long Distance Calls
Calls from UTL F  0.18  0.48  0.48  0.14  0.12  0.14  0.14  0.14
Calls from  UTL M  N/A  N/A  N/A  0.12  0.12  0.17  0.14  0.14
Calls from CeIel  0.21  0  13  0.33  0.18  ??  0.18  0.18  0.18
Calls from MTN F  N/A  N/A  N/A  0.14  0.17  0.17  0.12  0.12
Calls from MTN  M  ??  ??  0.18  0.14  ??  0.18  0.12  0.12
International Calls
US  1.32  1.20  1.62  1.11  0.78  1.46  0.83  0.83
UK  1.32  1.20  1.62  1.00  0.72  1.46  0.78  0.78
India  1.47  1.20  1.62  1.14  1.00  1.46  1.03  1.03
Rest of Afnca  1.10  1.50  1.62  0.83  1.06  1.46  1.08  1.08
East Africa  0.48  1.20  1.62  0.36  0.36  0.88  0.33  0.39
Connection Charges*  125  25  0  ??  22  24  256  25
Basic=  8  33
Montly Subscription Charges"  7  20  13  ??  19  21  ISD#  e17  19
Source:  UTL, Celtel, and MTN
7?  Not Available; NIA =  Not applicable
Connecion charge is  free for MTN in  1999 because all its accounts are prepad
"The  1999 UTL subscription charge is  for Digital  Exchange Line Rental. The subscripton charge for manual and
elecromechanical exdcaoes are  Ush 5.000 (USD 367) and Ush7,500 (USD  5.51). resoedtvely
All 2001  mobile lanffs are Postpaid.
(iii) Service Qualities and Financial  Performance.  In anticipation of privatization
government appointed a new manager and field interviews report a significant improvement
in UTL's treatment of customers, concern about its public image, and quality of services that58
are not technology driven (such as response time to complaints).  In addition UTL made a
net profit of shs  10 billion in 1999, the first time to make a profit in a very long time, since it
began to correct the problem of fictitious accounting for uncollected revenues.
Figure 18. UTL Return on Sales2'
(Net  Income  as % Sales)
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Source: UTL  -|  - Before ARBDA  -- After Asset Revaluation  and  Bad  Debt Adlustrnent
Call completion rates have not changed much (Figure  19),  despite considerable  increases in
UTL's traffic (see for example,  Figure 20).  This is largely due to the World Bank's
rehabilitation project,  although recent management improvements  are also a factor.  The
number of faults per main line has also remained steady at UTL's relative high levels  (Figure
21) , but faults cleared the same day has been in decline (Figure 22).
Figure 19. UTL: International Call Completion Rates
21  Adjustments:  (a) Fixed Assets in operations, depreciation  and inventories have been revalued using the CPI,
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Figure 20. Uganda: International  Telephone Traffic (in millions of minutes)
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Figure 22. UTL: % of Faults Cleared the Next  Day
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Despite recent improvements there are still service problems at UTL with
competition  (field interviews).  Large, irregular bills, long intervals between bills, and
serious delays and problems in resolving billing complaints continue,  partly because the
company did not get government approval to purchase an upgraded billing system.  By
1999, customers who were willing to pay Ush 200,000 for International  Subscriber Dialing
could get a special code to prevent UTL workers from using their number (which has been a
source of irregular bills and a security problem in the past).
By the time UTL was sold, a new billing system had been  acquired, giving customers
itemized bills.  The prepaid service had also been introduced.  With a minimum advance
payment of Ush 50,000 (about $30), one gets the ability to call any place in the world so
long as they are in credit.  The new majority shareholders have also gone a long way in
establishing a new corporate image projecting efficiency and customer care.  They have
increased the number and set up new locations of their front offices in prestigious buildings;61
they have continued training staff in customer care; bills are delivered regularly to the
registered premises of subscribers by courier;  and complaints are formally responded to.
The situation by 1999 was that although the number of payphones had increased,  the
UTL phones were often out of order; and the Starcom phones were reported to be better
maintained.  This situation has now changed with UTL addressing the earlier shortcomings.
Starcom almost collapsed because despite their very early start, they appear to have traded
more on knowing UTL's internal weaknesses rather than a careful study of the environment
to establish business opportunities.  Management was also poor.  Starcom might be the first
real victim of real competition.  Their operational merger with Infocom saved the ISP side
of their operation, but their other services have failed to stand up to real competition.  Along
the same lines, Swiftglobal,  one of the ISPs, sold out to Africa On Line.
(iv) Investment. Over the period 1995-2000, the telecommunications  sector saw a
total of US$ 203 million new investment by both the incumbent and the private operators.
MTN alone accounts for 48% of this total, which it invested in just two and a half year, the
incumbent operator accounts for 36% of the total while Celtel accounts for 15%  ( Figure 23).
The remaining  1  % was invested by various ISPs in the sector.  Overall, the new private
entrants made US$131 million worth of telecom investment, which is about 64% of the
total, in just few years.
Although it may be difficult to evaluate the relative efficiency of the investment by the
different operators, the cellular operators in Uganda produced  a line at just 18% of the
incumbent's investment cost of a line.  The incumbent operator spent US$ 3,975 of
investment to produce a line, which is considerably higher than the world average  that is
around US$ 1,500 (ITU, 1996), while the cellular operators produced a line at an average62
cost of US$ 700.22  This cost gap is mainly due to the differences  in technology between
fixed and cellular; however,  it is also indicative of the poor investment performance  of the
incumbent operator.  Additionally, the data substantiates the common argument in favor of
cellular, and clearly depicts the relative advantage  of cellular to meet the demand of
cornmunications famished nations  like Africa.
Figure 23: Uganda Telecommunications  Sector Investment (1995-2000)
(Total  Investment  = US$  203,339,068)
CeKtel  Note:  1. UTL figure does
15%  not include  investnent in
year  2000 after  it w as
Source:  UCC  and  UTL  p privatized.
(v)  Coverage  expansion and technology.  The growth of penetration of services has
been phenomenal.  Currently, MTN has deployed 264 cell  sites in 32 districts. They have
over 145,000 subscribers  and 1,580 public pay phones.  Celtel has also stepped  up their roll-
out, setting up a cumulative total of 36 cell sites in 18 districts.  Because of problems
described  earlier, Celtel does not offer fixed cellular services to date.  While the UTL
Telecel figures are not included, they have, at the end of this report's review period,
22  This should be interpreted with maximum precaution  as the calculation  does  not take into account  lags  in investment,  unused
capacities,  quality indicators,  and  investment in other facilities.63
embarked on a major roll-out plan.  It is difficult to conceive this level of expansion without
the competitive drive from multiple players in the sector.
A great advantage  of the cellular networks  is that as they provide coverage  to the
major roads and to the urban centers, they create signal availability in many rural areas
which would otherwise not be specifically targeted in the initial roll-out stages.
All the cellular networks  are based on GSM 900MHz, but applications to start using
the GSM 1800 MHz have been received and approved by UCC, with focus  on the urban
areas.  The MTN and Celtel networks are necessarily  100% digital.  UTL continues its
program of digitalization,  and now quotes a percentage  of 84.9% as digitalized.
Another area of technology penetration has been optical fiber.  UTL was the first to
lay out optical fiber for the back-haul from their switches in Kampala to their main switch.
They have now also run optical fibers from Kampala to Entebbe and Jinja.  Entebbe is now
easily accessed as part of the Kampala switching area.  MTN has also embarked on a major
project of connecting  the Central Business District as well as the Industrial area of Kampala
with  12 km of optical fiber (phase  1), later increasing to 50km. It can be argued that if the
privatized UTL was a monopoly, they would try to leverage maximum income out of their
legacy technology before investing heavily in new technology.  In the event, they really
have no choice now since their competitors  have invested in modem technology that gives
better performance and consequently better returns.  By the same token, overall sector
investment becomes synergetic  as each operator tries to maintain a competitive edge in
terms of coverage  and quality of service.64
(vi) The Rural Communications  Development Fund. One of the biggest challenges
facing UCC is ensuring universal access to communications.  An application was made to
the International Development Research  Corporation (IDRC) of Canada for the funding of a
base line, policy, and strategy study for the Rural Communications Development  Fund
(RCDF).  This was conducted during the second half of 2000 at a cost of Canadian Dollars
192,000 from IDRC and Shs 50 million from UCC.
The cumulative levy from service providers is supposed to reach $5.88 million by
2003.  The current estimate for various initiatives including public telephony access
throughout the country, and an internet point of presence at each of the 52 districts is $7
million by the end of 2002.  There has already been indication from the World Bank that
they might be willing to meet the financing shortfall for the period to the end of 2002.
The strategy is based on minimum subsidy competitive bidding for set roll-out
targets, targeted at areas that are clearly not viable in the short run.  There would also be
non-competitive  small grants to schools, small private sector operators (tele-kiosks) and
NGOs with good proposals.
One aspect of the RCDF is that it would target areas where the National Operators do not
exercise the right of first refusal.  The first reaction from them, a sure indication that most
areas are viable, is that they intend to cover all the areas in their business plans.  It is now
necessary for UCC to pose the question as to which areas they can reach in a specified time
frame.65
One interesting finding from the study was that the rural population are willing to
pay, and indeed do pay a mark up above normal rates for access in areas where one would
consider commercial  operation not viable.  (This was demonstrated by supplying  a Euroset
and an antenna to a businessman in a remote area and monitoring his income).  By
providing franchises to business people as an additional source of income, sustainable
access can be provided to many areas.
VII.  Conclusion
It is still early days in Uganda's telecommunications  reform, but experience to date
suggests several tentative conclusions.  First, privatizing into a competitive market does not
necessarily lower sales revenues for government.  Although we don't know the
counterfactual,  i.e.  the sales prices for UTL with an exclusivity agreement,  few observers in
Uganda believe that it would have been equal to the combined revenues from the sales of
the two network licenses.  Second, the delay in the sale of the incumbent may have helped
competition get established in Uganda.  In Ghana, the prompt sale of Ghana Telecom has
brought in an aggressive private operator who has used the dominant position of the
incumbent and the weakness of the regulator to force interconnection  agreements that are
highly advantageous  to GT.  UTL's weakness gave MTN a window to get established as a
viable competitor.  As a cellular operator this did not take it much time.  Only time will tell
if the newly privatized UTL can now effectively compete with MTN, and if MTN can
continue to be a strong presence in the market.  Indications in the eight months since the sale
of UTL indicate that this will be the case.  Third, the delays also allowed the UCC to get
established and this also helped boost Uganda's credibility with bidders for UTL.  Most
developing countries  do not set up a regulatory body until after the state-owned66
infrastructure provider has been privatized. Yet there is clearly a reputation advantage to
setting up the regulator beforehand.  Fourth, the fact that UTL was public helped UCC get
established.  The strongest operator was not able to exert influence to shape the regulator to
its advantage because its government owners constrained it (in contrast with Ghana)
Finally, the early evidence from Uganda supports the premise that competition will
expand access and improve service quickly.  We cannot judge whether that expansion was
faster than in countries with monopoly providers until we begin the comparative  analysis of
our cases.  It does seem likely that any purchaser of UTL would not have embarked on
setting up a new cellular system the way MTN has, but would have expanded  more slowly
by laying cable and using cellular only for mobile services.  It has to be noted though that
most serious operators now see the advantages in the rapidity of cellular rollout.  For the
particular case of Uganda, the sector appears to have greatly benefited  from the sale of a
second license before the sale of the incumbent.67
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